Carving Up the Pie of China  In this French cartoon from the late 1890s, the Great Powers of the day (from left to right: Great Britain’s Queen Victoria, Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm, Russia’s Tsar Nicholas II, a female figure representing France, and the Meiji emperor of Japan) participate in dividing China, while a Chinese figure behind them tries helplessly to stop the partition of his country. From *Le Petit Journal,* 1898; lithograph by Henri Meyer (1844-1899)/Private Collection/Roger-Viollet, Paris, France/Bridgeman Images
Several centuries ago, China was strong. ... In over 100 years after the 1840 Opium War, China suffered immensely from aggression, wars and chaos." Speaking in early 2017, Chinese president Xi Jinping thus reminded his listeners of Britain’s nineteenth-century violent intrusion into China’s history bearing shiploads of highly addictive opium. This conflict marked the beginning of what the Chinese still describe as a “century of humiliation.” In official Chinese thinking, it was only the victory of the Chinese Communist Party that enabled China to finally escape from that shameful past. Memories of the Opium War remain a central element of China’s “patriotic education” for the young, serving as a warning against uncritical admiration of the West and providing a rejoinder to any Western criticism of China. Almost 180 years after that clash between the Chinese and British empires, the Opium War retains an emotional resonance for many Chinese and offers a politically useful tool for the country’s government.

China was among the countries that confronted an aggressive and industrializing West while maintaining its formal independence, unlike the colonized areas discussed in Chapter 18. So too did Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Persia (now Iran), Ethiopia, and Siam (now Thailand). Latin America also falls in this category (see “The Industrial Revolution and Latin America in the Nineteenth Century” in Chapter 17). These states avoided outright incorporation into European colonial empires, retaining some ability to resist European aggression and to reform or transform...
their own societies. But they shared with their colonized counterparts the need to deal with four dimensions of the European moment in world history. First, they faced the immense military might and political ambitions of the major imperial powers. Second, they became enmeshed in networks of trade, investment, and sometimes migration that arose from an industrializing and capitalist Europe to generate a new world economy. Third, they were touched by various aspects of traditional European culture, as some among them learned the French, English, or German language; converted to Christianity; or studied European literature and philosophy. Fourth, they too engaged with the culture of modernity—its scientific rationalism; its technological achievements; its belief in a better future; and its ideas of nationalism, socialism, feminism, and individualism. In those epic encounters, they sometimes resisted, at other times accommodated, and almost always adapted what came from the West. They were active participants in the global drama of nineteenth-century world history, not simply its passive victims or beneficiaries.

At the same time, these societies were dealing with their own internal issues. Population growth and peasant rebellion wracked China; internal social and economic changes eroded the stability of Japanese public life; the great empires of the Islamic world shrank or disappeared; rivalry among competing elites troubled Latin American societies. China, the Ottoman Empire, and Japan provide a range of experiences, responses, and outcomes and many opportunities for comparison, as they navigated this era of colliding empires.

**Reversal of Fortune: China’s Century of Crisis**

In 1793, just a decade after King George III of Britain lost his North American colonies, he received yet another rebuff, this time from China. In a famous letter to the British monarch, the Chinese emperor Qianlong (chyan-loong) sharply rejected British requests for a less restricted trading relationship with his country. “Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance,” he declared. “There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians.” Qianlong’s snub simply continued the pattern of the previous several centuries, during which Chinese authorities had strictly controlled and limited the activities of European missionaries and merchants. But by 1912, little more than a century later, China’s long-established imperial state had collapsed, and the country had been transformed from a central presence in the global economy to a weak and dependent participant in a European-dominated world system in which Great Britain was the major economic and political player. It was a stunning reversal of fortune for a country that in Chinese eyes was the civilized center of the entire world—in their terms, the Celestial Empire or the Middle Kingdom.
Landmarks for Chapter 19

**CHINA**

1793  China rejects British request for open trade

1840–1842  First Opium War

1850–1864  Taiping Uprising

1856–1858  Second Opium War

1898–1901  Boxer Uprising

1911–1912  Chinese revolution; end of Qing dynasty

1830s  Famine, peasant uprisings, urban protests

1853  Commodore Perry’s arrival in Japan

1868  Meiji Restoration

1880s  Small feminist movement emerges

1889  Japanese constitution proclaimed

1894–1895  Japan defeats China

1904–1905  Japan defeats Russia

**OTTOMAN EMPIRE**

1789–1807  Reforms of Sultan Selim III

1839–1876  Tanzimat reforms

1870  Teacher training college for women opened

1876–1909  Reign of Sultan Abd al-Hamid II

1908  Military coup by Young Turks

**JAPAN**

1830s  Famine, peasant uprisings, urban protests

1853  Commodore Perry’s arrival in Japan

1868  Meiji Restoration

1880s  Small feminist movement emerges

1889  Japanese constitution proclaimed

1894–1895  Japan defeats China

1904–1905  Japan defeats Russia
The Crisis Within

In some ways, China was the victim of its own earlier success. Its robust economy and American food crops had enabled substantial population growth, from about 100 million people in 1685 to some 430 million in 1853. Unlike in Europe, though, where a similar population spurt took place, no Industrial Revolution accompanied this vast increase in the number of people, nor was agricultural production able to keep up. Neither did China’s internal expansion to the west and south generate anything like the wealth and resources that derived from Europe’s overseas empires. The result was growing pressure on the land, smaller farms for China’s huge peasant population, and, in all too many cases, unemployment, impoverishment, misery, and starvation.

Furthermore, China’s governing institutions did not keep pace with the growing population. Thus the state was increasingly unable to effectively perform its many functions, such as tax collection, flood control, social welfare, and public security. Gradually the central state lost power to provincial officials and local gentry. Among such officials, corruption was endemic, and harsh treatment of peasants was common. According to an official report issued in 1852, “Day and night soldiers are sent out to harass taxpayers. Sometimes corporal punishments are imposed upon tax delinquents; some of them are so badly beaten to exact the last penny that blood and flesh fly in all directions.”

Finally, European military pressure and economic penetration during the first half of the nineteenth century disrupted internal trade routes, created substantial unemployment, and raised peasant taxes.

This combination of circumstances, traditionally associated with a declining dynasty, gave rise to growing numbers of bandit gangs roaming the countryside and, even more dangerous, to outright peasant rebellion. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, such rebellions drew on a variety of peasant grievances and found leadership in charismatic figures proclaiming a millenarian religious message. Increasingly they also expressed opposition to the Qing dynasty because of its foreign Manchu origins. “We wait only for the northern region to be returned to a Han emperor,” declared one rebel group in the early nineteenth century. 

China’s internal crisis culminated in the Taiping Uprising, which set much of the country aflame between 1850 and 1864. This was a different kind of peasant upheaval. Its leaders largely rejected Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism alike, finding their primary ideology in a unique form of Christianity. Its leading figure, Hong Xiuquan (hong show-chwan) (1814–1864), proclaimed himself the younger brother of Jesus, sent to cleanse the world of demons and to establish a “heavenly kingdom of great peace.” Nor were these leaders content to restore an idealized Chinese society; instead they insisted on genuinely revolutionary change. They called for the abolition of private property, a radical redistribution of land, the end of prostitution and opium smoking, and the organization of society into sexually segregated military camps of men and women. Hong fiercely denounced the Qing dynasty as foreigners who had “poisoned China” and “defiled the emperor’s throne.” His cousin, Hong Rengan, developed plans for transforming China into an industrial nation, complete with railroads, health insurance for all, newspapers, and widespread public education.
Among the most revolutionary dimensions of the Taiping Uprising was its posture toward women and gender roles. This outlook reflected its origins among the minority Hakka people of southern China, where women were notably less restricted than Confucian orthodoxy prescribed. During the uprising, Hakka women, whose feet had never been bound, fought as soldiers in their own regiments, and in liberated regions, Taiping officials ordered that the feet of other women be unbound. The Taiping land reform program promised women and men equal shares of land. Women were now permitted to sit for civil service examinations and were appointed to supervisory positions, though usually ones in which they exercised authority over other women rather than men. Mutual attraction rather than family interests was promoted as a basis for marriage.

None of these reforms were consistently implemented during the short period of Taiping power, and the movement’s leadership demonstrated considerable ambivalence about equality for women. Hong himself reflected a much more traditional understanding of elite women’s role when he assembled a large personal harem and declared: “The duty of the palace women is to attend to the needs of their husbands; and it is arranged by Heaven that they are not to learn of the affairs outside.” Nonetheless, the Taiping posture toward women represented a sharp challenge to long-established gender roles and contributed to the hostility that the movement generated among many other Chinese, including women.

With a rapidly swelling number of followers, Taiping forces swept out of southern China and established their capital in Nanjing in 1853. For a time, the days of the Qing dynasty appeared to be over. But divisions and indecisiveness within the Taiping leadership, along with their inability to link up with several other rebel groups also operating separately in China, provided an opening for Qing dynasty loyalists to rally and by 1864 to crush this most unusual of peasant rebellions. Western military support for pro-Qing forces likewise contributed to their victory. It was not, however, the imperial military forces of the central government that defeated the rebels. Instead provincial military leaders, fearing the radicalism of the Taiping program, mobilized their own armies, which in the end crushed the rebel forces.

Thus the Qing dynasty was saved, but it was also weakened as the provincial gentry consolidated their power at the expense of the central state. The intense conservatism of both imperial authorities and their gentry supporters postponed...
any resolution of China’s peasant problem, delayed any real change for China’s women, and deferred vigorous efforts at modernization until the communists came to power in the mid-twentieth century. More immediately, the devastation and destruction occasioned by this massive civil war seriously disrupted and weakened China’s economy. Estimates of the number of lives lost range from 20 to 30 million. In human terms, it was the most costly conflict in the world during the nineteenth century, and it took China more than a decade to recover from its devastation. China’s internal crisis in general and the Taiping Uprising in particular also provided a highly unfavorable setting for the country’s encounter with a Europe newly invigorated by the Industrial Revolution.

Western Pressures

Nowhere was the shifting balance of global power in the nineteenth century more evident than in China’s changing relationship with Europe, a transformation that registered most dramatically in the famous Opium Wars. Derived from Arab traders in the eighth century or earlier, opium had long been used on a small scale as a drinkable medicine; it was regarded as a magical cure for dysentery and described by one poet as “fit for Buddha.” It did not become a serious problem until the late eighteenth century, when the British began to use opium, grown and processed in India, to cover their persistent trade imbalance with China. By the 1830s, British, American, and other Western merchants had found an enormous, growing, and very profitable market for this highly addictive drug. From 1,000 chests (each weighing roughly 150 pounds) in 1773, China’s opium imports exploded to more than 23,000 chests in 1832. (See Snapshot, page 833.)

By then, Chinese authorities recognized a mounting problem on many levels. Because opium importation was illegal, it had to be smuggled into China, thus flouting Chinese law. Bribery to turn a blind eye to the illegal trade, many officials were corrupted. Furthermore, a massive outflow of silver to pay for the opium reversed China’s centuries-long ability to attract much of the world’s silver supply, and this imbalance caused serious economic problems. Finally, China found itself with many millions of addicts—even men and women, court officials, students preparing for exams, soldiers going into combat, and common laborers seeking to overcome the pain of addiction.

Addiction to Opium Throughout the nineteenth century, opium imports created a massive addiction problem in China, as this photograph of an opium den from around 1900 suggests. Not until the early twentieth century did the British prove willing to curtail the opium trade from their Indian colony. (Hulton Deutsch/Getty Images)
and drudgery of their work. Following an extended debate at court in 1836 on whether to legalize the drug or crack down on its use, the emperor decided on suppression. An upright official, Commissioner Lin Zexu (lin zuh-SHOO), led the campaign against opium use as a kind of “drug czar.” (See Zooming In: Lin Zexu, page 834.) The British, offended by the seizure of their property in opium and emboldened by their new military power, sent a large naval expedition to China, determined to end the restrictive conditions under which they had long traded with that country. In the process, they would teach the Chinese a lesson about the virtues of free trade and the “proper” way to conduct relations among countries. Thus began the first Opium War (1840–1842), in which Britain’s industrialized military might proved decisive. The Treaty of Nanjing, which ended the war in 1842, largely on British terms, imposed numerous restrictions on Chinese sovereignty and opened five ports to European traders. Its provisions reflected the changed balance of global power that had emerged with Britain’s Industrial Revolution. To the Chinese, that agreement represented the first of the “unequal treaties” that seriously eroded China’s independence by the end of the century.

But it was not the last of those treaties. Britain’s victory in a second Opium War (1856–1858) was accompanied by the brutal vandalizing of the emperor’s exquisite Summer Palace outside Beijing and resulted in further humiliations. Still more ports were opened to foreign traders. Now those foreigners were allowed to travel

### SNAPSHOT  Chinese/British Trade at Canton, 1835–1836

Calculate opium exports as a percentage of British exports to China, Britain’s trade deficit without opium, and its trade surplus with opium. What did this pattern mean for China?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Value (in Spanish dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Exports to Canton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>17,904,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>8,357,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other items (sandalwood, lead, iron,</td>
<td>6,164,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tin, cotton yarn and piece goods, tin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plates, watches, clocks)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32,426,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Imports from Canton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea (black and green)</td>
<td>13,412,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw silk</td>
<td>3,764,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermillion</td>
<td>705,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other goods (sugar products, camphor,</td>
<td>5,971,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>silver, gold, copper, musk)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,852,899</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### AP Analyzing Evidence

What do these figures suggest about the role of opium in British trade with China?

### AP Causation

To what extent did actions by outsiders lead to significant changes in China during the nineteenth century?
Lin Zexu: Confronting the Opium Trade

When the Chinese emperor decided in 1838 on firm measures to suppress the opium trade, he selected Lin Zexu to enforce that policy. Born in 1785, Lin was the son of a rather poor but scholarly father who had never achieved an official position. Lin, however, excelled academically, passing the highest-level examinations in 1811 after two failed attempts and then rising rapidly in the ranks of China’s bureaucracy. In the process, he gained a reputation as a strict and honest official; he was immune to bribery, genuinely concerned with the welfare of the peasantry, and unafraid to confront the corruption and decadence of rich and poor alike.

And so in December of 1838, after some nineteen personal audiences with the emperor, Lin found himself in Canton, the center of the opium trade and the only Chinese city legally open to foreign merchants. He was facing the greatest challenge of his professional life. Undertaken with the best of intentions, his actions were unable to prevent a war with Britain, which propelled the country into a century of humiliating subservience to an industrializing Europe and forced growing numbers of Chinese to question their vaunted civilization.

In established Confucian fashion, Lin undertook his enormous task with a combination of moral appeals, reasoned argument, political pressure, and coercion, while hoping to avoid outright armed conflict. It was an approach that focused on both the demand and supply sides of the problem. In dealing with Chinese opium users, Lin emphasized the health hazards of the drug and demanded that people turn in their supplies of opium and the pipes used to smoke it. By mid-1839, he had confiscated some 50,000 pounds of the drug, together with over 70,000 pipes, and arrested some 1,700 dealers. Hundreds of local students were summoned to an assembly where they were invited to identify opium distributors and to suggest ways freely and buy land in China, to preach Christianity under the protection of Chinese authorities, and to patrol some of China’s rivers. Furthermore, the Chinese were forbidden to use the character for “barbarians” to refer to the British in official documents. Following later military defeats at the hands of the French (1885) and Japanese (1895), China lost control of Vietnam, Korea, and Taiwan. By the end of the century, the Western nations plus Japan and Russia had all carved out spheres of influence within China, granting themselves special privileges to establish military bases, extract raw materials, and build railroads. Many Chinese believed that their country was being “carved up like a melon” (see Map 19.1 and the chapter-opening photo).

Coupled with its internal crisis, China’s encounter with European imperialism had reduced the proud Middle Kingdom to dependency on the Western powers as it became part of a European-based “informal empire,” an area dominated by Western powers but retaining its own government and a measure of independence.

photo: Pictures from History/The Image Works
of dealing with the problem. Opium-using officials became the target of investigations, and five-person teams were established to enforce the ban on opium smoking on one another.

Lin applied a similar mix of methods to the foreign suppliers of opium. A moralistic appeal to Queen Victoria argued that the articles the English imported from China—silk, tea, and rhubarb—were all beneficial. “By what right,” he asked, “do [the barbarians] use this poisonous drug to injure Chinese people?” He pointedly reminded Europeans that new regulations, applying to Chinese and foreigners alike, fixed the penalty for dealing in opium at “decapitation or strangling.” Then he demanded that foreign traders hand over their opium, and without compensation. When the merchants hesitated, Lin tightened the screws, ordering all Chinese employed by foreigners to leave their jobs and blockading the Europeans in their factories. After six weeks of negotiations, the Europeans capitulated, turning over some 3 million pounds of raw opium to Lin Zexu.

Disposing of the drug was an enormous task. Workers, stripped and searched daily to prevent looting, dug three huge trenches into which they placed the opium mixed with water, salt, and lime and then flushed the concoction into the sea. (See the image in this feature, which shows the commissioner overseeing this process.) Lin also offered a sacrifice to the Sea Spirit, apologizing for introducing this poison into its domain and “advising the Spirit to tell the creatures of the water to move away for a time.” He informed the emperor that throngs of local people flocked to witness the destruction of the opium. And foreigners too came to observe the spectacle. Lin reported, “[The foreigners] do not dare to show any disrespect, and indeed I should judge from their attitudes that they have the decency to feel heartily ashamed.”

Had Lin been correct in his appraisal, history would have taken a very different turn. But neither Lin nor his superiors anticipated the response that these actions provoked from the British government. They were also largely unaware that European industrial and military advances had decisively shifted the balance of power between China and the West. Arriving in 1840, a British military expedition quickly demonstrated its superiority and initiated the devastating Opium War that marked Lin’s policies in Canton as a failure.

As a punishment for his unsatisfactory performance, the emperor sent Lin to a remote post in western China. Although his career rebounded somewhat after 1845, he died in 1850 while on the way to an appointment aimed at suppressing the Taiping rebellion. While his reputation suffered in the nineteenth century, it recovered in the twentieth as an intensely nationalist China recalled his principled stand against Western imperialism.

**QUESTIONS**

What other methods might Lin Zexu have used to stop the British opium trade in China?

China was no longer the center of civilization to which barbarians paid homage and tribute, but just one weak and dependent nation among many others. The Qing dynasty remained in power, but in a weakened condition, which served European interests well and Chinese interests poorly. Restrictions imposed by the unequal treaties clearly inhibited China’s industrialization, as foreign goods and foreign investment flooded the country largely unrestricted. Chinese businessmen mostly served foreign firms, rather than developing as an independent capitalist class capable of leading China’s own Industrial Revolution.

**The Failure of Conservative Modernization**

Chinese authorities were not passive in the face of their country’s mounting internal and external crises. Known as “self-strengthening,” their policies during the 1860s and 1870s sought to reinvigorate a traditional China while borrowing
As China was reeling from massive internal upheavals during the nineteenth century, it also faced external assaults from Russia, Japan, and various European powers. By the end of the century, large parts of China were divided into spheres of influence, each affiliated with one of the major industrial powers of the day.

**Reading the Map:** Which foreign powers gained the most from their “unequal treaties” with China? What geographic features in China did foreign powers value?

**Interpreting the Map:** To what extent were Japan’s imperialist efforts in China more successful than those by European powers?
cautiously from the West. An overhauled examination system, designed to recruit qualified candidates for official positions, sought the “good men” who could cope with the massive reconstruction that China faced in the wake of the Taiping rebellion. Support for landlords and the repair of dikes and irrigation helped restore rural social and economic order. A few industrial factories producing textiles and steel were established, coal mines were expanded, and a telegraph system was initiated. One Chinese general in 1863 confessed his humiliation that “Chinese weapons are far inferior to those of foreign countries.” A number of modern arsenals, shipyards, and foreign-language schools sought to remedy this deficiency.

Self-strengthening as an overall program for China’s modernization was inhibited by the fears of conservative leaders that urban, industrial, or commercial development would erode the power and privileges of the landlord class. Furthermore, the new industries remained largely dependent on foreigners for machinery, materials, and expertise. And they served to strengthen local authorities, who largely controlled those industries, rather than the central Chinese state.

The general failure of “self-strengthening” became apparent at the end of the century, when China suffered a humiliating military defeat by Japan (1894–1895). This failure was only confirmed when an antiforeign movement known as the Boxer Uprising (1898–1901) erupted in northern China. Led by militia organizations calling themselves the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists, the “Boxers” killed numerous Europeans and Chinese Christians and laid siege to the foreign embassies in Beijing. When Western powers and Japan occupied Beijing to crush the rebellion and imposed a huge payment on China as a punishment, it was clear that China remained a dependent country, substantially under foreign control.

No wonder, then, that growing numbers of educated Chinese, including many in official elite positions, became highly disillusioned with the Qing dynasty, which was both foreign and ineffective in protecting China. By the late 1890s, such people were organizing a variety of clubs, study groups, and newspapers to examine China’s desperate situation and to explore alternative paths. The names of these organizations reflect their outlook—the National Rejuvenation Study Society, Society to Protect the Nation, and Understand the National Shame Society. They admired not only Western science and technology but also Western political practices that limited the authority of the ruler and permitted wider circles of people to take part in public life. They believed that only a truly unified nation in which rulers and ruled were closely related could save China from dismemberment at the hands of foreign imperialists. Despite the small number of women who took part in these discussions, traditional gender roles became yet another focus of opposition. No one expressed that issue more forcefully than Qiu Jin (1875–1907), the rebellious daughter of a gentry family who started a women’s journal, arguing that liberated women were essential for a strong Chinese nation, and became involved in revolutionary politics. (For more on Qiu Jin, see Working with Evidence, Source 19.3, page 859.) Thus was born the immensely powerful force of Chinese nationalism, directed alike against Western imperialists, the foreign Qing dynasty, and aspects of China’s traditional culture.
The Qing dynasty response to these new pressures proved inadequate. A flurry of progressive imperial edicts in 1898, known as the Hundred Days of Reform, was soon squelched by conservative forces. More extensive reform in the early twentieth century, including the end of the old examination system and the promise of a national parliament, was a classic case of too little too late. (See Working with Evidence: China: On the Brink of Change, page 857.) In 1912 the last Chinese emperor abdicated as the ancient imperial order that had governed China for two millennia collapsed, with only a modest nudge from organized revolutionaries. This Chinese revolution of 1911–1912 marked the end of a long era in China’s long history and the beginning of an immense struggle over the country’s future.

The Ottoman Empire and the West in the Nineteenth Century

Like China, the Islamic world represented a highly successful civilization that felt little need to learn from the “infidels” or “barbarians” of the West until it collided with an expanding and aggressive Europe in the nineteenth century. Unlike China, though, Islamic civilization had been a near neighbor to Europe for 1,000 years. Its most prominent state, the Ottoman Empire, had long governed substantial parts of southeastern Europe and had posed a clear military and religious threat to Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But if its encounter with the West was less abrupt than that of China, it was no less consequential. Neither the Ottoman Empire nor China fell under direct colonial rule, but both were much diminished as the changing balance of global power took hold; both launched efforts at “defensive modernization” aimed at strengthening their states and preserving their independence; and in both societies, some people held tightly to old identities and values, even as others embraced new loyalties associated with nationalism and modernity.

“The Sick Man of Europe”

In 1750, the Ottoman Empire was still the central political fixture of a widespread Islamic world. From its Turkish heartland in Anatolia, it ruled over much of the Arab world, from which Islam had come. It protected pilgrims on their way to Mecca, governed Egypt and coastal North Africa, and incorporated millions of Christians in the Balkans. Its ruler, the sultan, claimed the role of caliph, successor to the Prophet Muhammad, and was widely viewed as the leader, defender, and primary representative of the Islamic world. But by the middle, and certainly by the end, of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was no longer able to deal with Europe from a position of equality, let alone superiority. Among the Great Powers of the West, it was now known as “the sick man of Europe.” Within the Muslim world, the Ottoman Empire, once viewed as “the strong sword of Islam,” was unable to prevent region after region—India, Indonesia, West Africa, Central Asia—from falling under the control of Christian powers.
The Ottoman Empire's own domains shrank considerably at the hands of Russian, British, Austrian, and French aggression (see Map 19.2). In 1798, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, which had long been a province of the Ottoman Empire, was a particularly stunning blow. A contemporary observer, Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, described the French entry into Cairo:

The French entered the city like a torrent rushing through the alleys and streets without anything to stop them, like demons of the Devil's army. . . . And the French trod in the Mosque of al-Azhar with their shoes, carrying swords and rifles. . . . They plundered whatever they found in the mosque. . . .

In what ways does al-Jabarti’s language reveal his point of view about the French entry into Cairo?

Map 19.2  The Contraction of the Ottoman Empire
Foreign aggression and nationalist movements substantially diminished the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century, but they also stimulated a variety of efforts to revive and reform Ottoman society.

READING THE MAP: Aside from North Africa, where did the Ottoman Empire lose the most territory between 1800 and 1913?

MAKING CONNECTIONS: Compare this map with Map 13.4: The Ottoman Empire. How does the Ottoman Empire in 1800 compare to the empire in 1566? Had the empire already lost major territories before 1800, or does much of the decline seem to have occurred between 1800 and 1913?

AP® Causation
What geographic features made the weakened Ottoman Empire attractive to Russia in the nineteenth century?
They treated the books and Quranic volumes as trash. . . . Furthermore, they soiled the mosque, blowing their spit in it, pissing and defecating in it. They guzzled wine and smashed bottles in the central court.  

When the French left, a virtually independent Egypt pursued a modernizing and empire-building program of its own during the early and mid-nineteenth century and on one occasion came close to toppling the Ottoman Empire itself.

Beyond territorial losses to stronger European powers, other parts of the empire, such as Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania, achieved independence based on their own surging nationalism and support from the British or the Russians. The continued independence of the core region of the Ottoman Empire owed much to the inability of Europe’s Great Powers to agree on how to divide it up among themselves.

Behind the contraction of the Ottoman Empire lay other problems. As in China, the central Ottoman state had weakened, particularly in its ability to raise necessary revenue, as provincial authorities and local warlords gained greater power. Moreover, the Janissaries, once the effective and innovative elite infantry units of Ottoman military forces, lost their military edge, becoming a highly conservative force within the empire. The technological and military gap with the West was clearly growing.

Economically, the earlier centrality of the Ottoman and Arab lands in Afro-Eurasian commerce diminished as Europeans achieved direct oceanic access to the treasures of Asia. Competition from cheap European manufactured goods hit Ottoman artisans hard and led to urban riots protesting foreign imports. Furthermore, a series of agreements, known as capitulations, between European countries and the Ottoman Empire granted Westerners various exemptions from Ottoman law and taxation. Like the unequal treaties with China, these agreements facilitated European penetration of the Ottoman economy and became widely resented. Such measures eroded Ottoman sovereignty and reflected the changing position of that empire relative to Europe. So too did the growing indebtedness of the Ottoman Empire, which came to rely on foreign loans to finance its efforts at economic development. By 1881, its inability to pay the interest on those debts led to foreign control of much of its revenue-generating system, while a similar situation in Egypt led to its outright occupation by the British. Like China, the Ottoman Empire had fallen into a position of considerable dependency on Europe.

Reform and Its Opponents

The leadership of the Ottoman Empire recognized many of its problems and during the nineteenth century mounted increasingly ambitious programs of “defensive modernization” that were earlier, more sustained, and far more vigorous than the timid and halfhearted measures of self-strengthening in China. One reason perhaps lay in the absence of any internal upheaval, such as the Taiping Uprising in China, which threatened the very existence of the ruling dynasty. Nationalist revolts on the empire’s periphery, rather than Chinese-style peasant rebellion at the center, represented the primary internal crisis of nineteenth-century Ottoman history.
Nor did the Middle East in general experience the explosive population growth that contributed so much to China’s nineteenth-century crisis. Furthermore, the long-established Ottoman leadership was Turkic and Muslim, culturally similar to its core population, whereas China’s Qing dynasty rulers were widely regarded as foreigners from Manchuria.

Ottoman reforms began in the late eighteenth century when Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) sought to reorganize and update the army, drawing on European advisers and techniques. Even these modest innovations stirred the hostility of powerful factions among both the ulama (religious scholars) and the elite military corps of Janissaries, who saw them in conflict with both Islam and their own institutional interests. Opposition to his measures was so strong that Selim was overthrown in 1807 and then murdered. Subsequent sultans, however, crushed the Janissaries and brought the ulama more thoroughly under state control than elsewhere in the Islamic world.

Then, in the several decades after 1839, more far-reaching reformist measures, known as Tanzimat (tahn-zee-MAHT) (reorganization), took shape as the Ottoman leadership sought to provide the economic, social, and legal underpinnings for a strong and newly recentralized state. Factories producing cloth, paper, and armaments; modern mining operations; reclamation and resettlement of agricultural land; telegraphs, steamships, railroads, and a modern postal service; Western-style law codes and courts; new elementary and secondary schools—all of these new departures began a long process of modernization and westernization in the Ottoman Empire.

Even more revolutionary, at least in principle, were changes in the legal status of the empire’s diverse communities, which now gave non-Muslims equal rights under the law. An imperial proclamation of 1856 declared:

Every distinction or designation tending to make any class whatever of the subjects of my Empire inferior to another class, on account of their religion, language or race shall be forever effaced. . . . No subject of my Empire shall be hindered in the exercise of the religion that he professes . . . . All the subjects...
of my Empire, without distinction of nationality, shall be admissible to public employment.

This declaration represented a dramatic change that challenged the fundamentally Islamic character of the state. Mixed tribunals with representatives from various religious groups were established to hear cases involving non-Muslims. More Christians were appointed to high office. A mounting tide of secular legislation and secular schools, drawing heavily on European models, now competed with traditional Islamic institutions.

Although Tanzimat-era reforms did not directly address gender issues, they did stimulate modest educational openings for women, mostly in Istanbul, with a training program for midwives in 1842, a girls’ secondary school in 1858, and a teacher training college for women in 1870. Furthermore, the reform-minded class that emerged from the Tanzimat era generally favored greater opportunities for women as a means of strengthening the state, and a number of upper- and middle-class women were involved in these discussions. During the 1870s and 1880s, the prominent female poet Sair Nigar Hanım held weekly “salons” in which reformist intellectuals of both sexes participated.

The reform process raised profound and highly contested questions. What was the Ottoman Empire, and who were its people? Were they Ottoman subjects of a dynastic state, Turkish citizens of a national state, or Muslim believers in a religiously defined state? For decades, the answers oscillated, as few people wanted to choose decisively among these alternative identities.

To those who supported the reforms, the Ottoman Empire was an inclusive state, all of whose people were loyal to the dynasty that ruled it. This was the outlook of a new class spawned by the reform process itself—lower-level officials, military officers, writers, poets, and journalists, many of whom had a modern Western-style education. Dubbed the Young Ottomans, they were active during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, as they sought major changes in the Ottoman political system itself. They favored a more European-style parliamentary and constitutional regime that could curtail the absolute power of the sultan. Only such a political system, they felt, could mobilize the energies of the country to overcome backwardness and preserve the state against European aggression. Known as Islamic modernism, such ideas found expression in many parts of the Muslim world in the second half of the century. Muslim societies, the Young Ottomans argued, needed to embrace Western technical and scientific knowledge, while rejecting its materialism. Islam in their view could accommodate a full modernity without sacrificing its essential religious character. After all, the Islamic world had earlier hosted impressive scientific achievements and had incorporated elements of Greek philosophical thinking.

In 1876, the Young Ottomans experienced a short-lived victory when Sultan Abd al-Hamid II (r. 1876–1909) accepted a constitution and an elected parliament, but not for long. Under the pressure of war with Russia, the sultan soon suspended the reforms and reverted to an older style of despotic rule for the next
The Ottoman Empire and the West in the Nineteenth Century

By the 1870s, the Ottoman Empire had been a major power for over a thousand years, but it was facing a new era of Western influence and internal political challenges. The Young Turks, a group of military and civilian elites, rose to power and sought to modernize the empire along Western lines.

A military coup in 1908 allowed the Young Turks to exercise real power. They pushed for a radical secularization of schools, courts, and law codes; permitted elections and competing parties; established a single Law of Family Rights for all regardless of religion; and encouraged Turkish as the official language of the empire. They also opened modern schools for women, including access to Istanbul University; allowed women to wear Western clothing; restricted polygamy; and permitted women to obtain divorces in some situations. Women established a number of publications and organizations, some of them linked to British suffrage groups. In the western cities of the empire, some women abandoned their veils.

But the nationalist Turkish conception of Ottoman identity antagonized non-Turkic peoples and helped stimulate Arab and other nationalisms in response. For some, a secular nationality was becoming the most important public loyalty, with Islam relegated to private life. Nationalist sentiments contributed to the complete disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.
Ottoman Empire following World War I, but the secularizing and westernizing principles of the Young Turks informed the policies of the Turkish republic that replaced it.

**Outcomes: Comparing China and the Ottoman Empire**

By the beginning of the twentieth century, both China and the Ottoman Empire, recently centers of proud and vibrant civilizations, had experienced the consequences of a rapidly shifting balance of global power. Now they were “semi-colonies” within the “informal empires” of Europe, although they retained sufficient independence for their governments to launch catch-up efforts of defensive modernization, the Ottomans earlier and the Chinese later. But neither was able to create the industrial economies or strong states required to fend off European intrusion and restore their former status in the world. Despite their diminished power, however, both China and the Ottoman Empire gave rise to new nationalist conceptions of society that were initially small and limited in appeal but of great significance for the future.

In the early twentieth century, that future witnessed the end of both the Chinese and Ottoman empires. In China, the collapse of the imperial system in 1912 was followed by a vast revolutionary upheaval that by 1949 led to a communist regime within largely the same territorial space as the old empire. By contrast, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following World War I led to the creation of the new but much smaller nation-state of Turkey in the Anatolian heartland of the old empire, which lost its vast Arab and European provinces.

China’s twentieth-century revolutionaries rejected traditional Confucian culture far more thoroughly than the secularizing leaders of modern Turkey rejected Islam. Almost everywhere in the Islamic world, including Turkey, traditional religion retained its hold on the private loyalties of most people and later in the twentieth century became a basis for social renewal in many places. Islamic civilization, unlike its Chinese counterpart, had many independent centers and was never so closely associated with a single state. Furthermore, it was embedded in a deeply religious tradition that was personally meaningful to millions of adherents, in contrast to the more elitist and secular outlook of Confucianism. Many Chinese, however, retained traditional Confucian values such as filial piety, and Confucianism has made something of a comeback in China over the past several decades. Nonetheless, Islam retained a hold on its civilization in the twentieth century rather more firmly than Confucianism did in China.

**The Japanese Difference: The Rise of a New East Asian Power**

Like China and the Ottoman Empire, the island country of Japan confronted the aggressive power of the West during the nineteenth century. This threat took shape as U.S. commodore Matthew Perry’s “black ships” steamed into Tokyo Bay in 1853.
and forcefully demanded that this reclusive nation open up to more “normal” relations with the world. However, the outcome of that encounter differed sharply from the others. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan undertook a radical transformation of its society—a “revolution from above,” according to some historians—that turned it into a powerful, modern, united, industrialized nation. It was an achievement that neither China nor the Ottoman Empire was able to duplicate. Far from succumbing to Western domination, Japan joined the club of imperialist countries by creating its own East Asian empire at the expense of China and Korea. In building a society that was both modern and distinctly Japanese, Japan demonstrated that modernity was not a uniquely European phenomenon. This “Japanese miracle,” as some have called it, was both promising and ominous for the rest of Asia.

The Tokugawa Background

For 250 years prior to Perry’s arrival, Japan had been governed by a shogun (a military ruler) from the Tokugawa family who acted in the name of a revered but powerless emperor who lived in Kyoto, 300 miles away from the seat of power in Edo (Tokyo). The chief task of this Tokugawa shogunate was to prevent the return of civil war among some 260 rival feudal lords, known as daimyo, each of whom had a cadre of armed retainers, the famed samurai warriors of Japanese tradition.

Based on their own military power and political skills, successive shoguns gave Japan more than two centuries of internal peace (1600–1850). To control the restive daimyo, they required these local authorities to create second homes in Edo, the country’s capital, where they had to live during alternate years. When they left for their rural residences, families stayed behind, almost as hostages. Nonetheless, the daimyo, especially the more powerful ones, retained substantial autonomy in their own domains and behaved in some ways like independent states, with separate military forces, law codes, tax systems, and currencies. With no national army, no uniform currency, and little central authority at the local level, Tokugawa Japan was “pacified . . . but not really unified.” To further stabilize the country, the Tokugawa regime issued highly detailed rules governing the occupation, residence, dress, hairstyles, and behavior of the four hierarchically ranked status groups into which Japanese society was divided—samurai at the top, then peasants, artisans, and, at the bottom, merchants.

During these 250 years of peace, much was changing within Japan in ways that belied the control and orderliness of Tokugawa regulations. For one thing, the samurai, in the absence of wars to fight, evolved into a salaried bureaucratic or administrative class amounting to 5 to 6 percent of the total population, but they remained fiercely devoted to their daimyo lords and to their warrior code of loyalty, honor, and self-sacrifice.

More generally, centuries of peace contributed to a remarkable burst of economic growth, commercialization, and urban development. Entrepreneurial peasants, using fertilizers and other agricultural innovations, grew more rice than ever before and...
engaged in a variety of rural manufacturing enterprises as well. By 1750, Japan had become perhaps the world’s most urbanized country, with about 10 percent of its population living in sizable towns or cities. Edo, with perhaps a million residents, was among the world’s largest cities. Well-functioning networks of exchange linked urban and rural areas, marking Japan as an emerging market economy. The influence of Confucianism encouraged education and generated a remarkably literate population, with about 40 percent of men and 15 percent of women able to read and write. Although no one was aware of it at the time, these changes during the Tokugawa era provided a solid foundation for Japan’s remarkable industrial growth in the late nineteenth century.

Such changes also undermined the shogunate’s efforts to freeze Japanese society in the interests of stability. Some samurai found the lowly but profitable path of commerce too much to resist. “No more shall we have to live by the sword,” declared one of them in 1616 while renouncing his samurai status. “I have seen that great profit can be made honorably. I shall brew sake and soy sauce, and we shall prosper.” Many merchants, though hailing from the lowest-ranking status group, prospered in the new commercial environment and supported a vibrant urban culture, while not a few daimyo found it necessary, if humiliating, to seek loans from these social inferiors. Thus merchants had money, but little status, whereas samurai enjoyed high status but were often indebted to inferior merchants. Both resented their positions.

Despite prohibitions to the contrary, many peasants moved to the cities, becoming artisans or merchants and imitating the ways of their social betters. A decree of 1788 noted that peasants “have become accustomed to luxury and forgetful of their status.” They wore inappropriate clothing, used umbrellas rather than straw hats in the rain, and even left the villages for the city. “Henceforth,” declared the shogun, “all luxuries should be avoided by the peasants. They are to live simply and devote themselves to farming.” This decree, like many others before it, was widely ignored.

More than social change undermined the Tokugawa regime. Corruption was widespread, to the disgust of many. The shogunate’s failure to deal successfully with a severe famine in the 1830s eroded confidence in its effectiveness. At the same time, a mounting wave of local peasant uprisings and urban riots expressed the many grievances of the poor. The most striking of these outbursts left the city of Osaka in flames in 1837. Its leader, Oshio Heihachiro, no doubt spoke for many ordinary people when he wrote:

We must first punish the officials who torment the people so cruelly; then we must execute the haughty and rich Osaka merchants. Then we must distribute the gold, silver, and copper stored in their cellars, and bands of rice hidden in their storehouses.

From the 1830s on, one historian concluded, “there was a growing feeling that the shogunate was losing control.”

**AP® Comparison**

To what extent was the social and economic status of the merchant class in Japan and China similar?

**AP® Comparison**

To what extent were these factors that led to the downfall of the Tokugawa regime similar to factors that led to the downfall of earlier governments throughout history?
American Intrusion and the Meiji Restoration

It was foreign intervention that brought matters to a head. Since the expulsion of European missionaries and the harsh suppression of Christianity in the early seventeenth century, Japan had deliberately limited its contact with the West to a single port, where only the Dutch were allowed to trade. (See “Asians and Asian Commerce” in Chapter 14.) By the early nineteenth century, however, various European countries and the United States were knocking at the door. All were turned away, and even shipwrecked sailors or whalers were expelled, jailed, or executed. As it happened, it was the United States that forced the issue, sending Commodore Perry in 1853 to demand humane treatment for castaways, the right of American vessels to refuel and buy provisions, and the opening of ports for trade. Authorized to use force if necessary, Perry presented his reluctant hosts with, among other gifts, a white flag for surrender should hostilities follow.

In the end, the Japanese avoided war. Aware of what had happened to China as a result of resisting European demands, Japan agreed to a series of unequal treaties with various Western powers. That humiliating capitulation to the demands of the “foreign devils” further eroded support for the shogunate, triggered a brief civil
war, and by 1868 led to a political takeover by a group of young samurai from southern Japan. This decisive turning point in Japan’s history was known as the Meiji Restoration, for the country’s new rulers claimed that they were restoring to power the young emperor, then a fifteen-year-old boy whose throne name was Meiji (MAY-je), or Enlightened Rule. Despite his youth, he was regarded as the most recent link in a chain of descent that traced the origins of the imperial family back to the sun goddess Amaterasu. Having eliminated the shogunate, the patriotic young men who led the takeover soon made their goals clear—to save Japan from foreign domination not by futile resistance, but by a thorough transformation of Japanese society drawing on all that the modern West had to offer. “Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world,” they declared, “so as to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule.”

Japan now had a government committed to a decisive break with the past, and it had acquired that government without massive violence or destruction. By contrast, the defeat of the Taiping Uprising had deprived China of any such opportunity for a fresh start, while saddling it with enormous devastation and massive loss of life. Furthermore, Japan was of less interest to Western powers than either China, with its huge potential market and reputation for riches, or the Ottoman Empire, with its strategic location at the crossroads of Asia, Africa, and Europe. The American Civil War and its aftermath likewise deflected U.S. ambitions in the Pacific for a time, further reducing the Western pressure on Japan.

Modernization Japanese-Style

These circumstances gave Japan some breathing space, and its new rulers moved quickly to take advantage of that unique window of opportunity. Thus they launched a cascading wave of dramatic changes that rolled over the country in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. Like the more modest reforms of China and the Ottoman Empire, Japanese modernizing efforts were defensive, based on fears that Japanese independence was in grave danger. Those reforms, however, were revolutionary in their cumulative effect, transforming Japan far more thoroughly than even the most radical of the Ottoman efforts, let alone the limited “self-strengthening” policies of the Chinese.

The first task was genuine national unity, which required an attack on the power and privileges of both the daimyo and the samurai. In a major break with the past, the new regime soon ended the semi-independent domains of the daimyo, replacing them with governors appointed by and responsible to the national government. The central state, not the local authorities, now collected the nation’s taxes and raised a national army based on conscription from all social classes.

Thus the samurai relinquished their ancient role as the country’s warrior class and with it their cherished right to carry swords. The old Confucian-based social order with its special privileges for various classes was largely dismantled, and almost all Japanese became legally equal as commoners and as subjects of the emperor.

You should understand the political and social features of the Meiji Restoration.

To what extent were Japanese reformers justified in believing their independence was in danger?

To what extent did Japan’s nineteenth-century transformations result in revolutionary changes?

Limitations on travel and trade likewise fell as a nationwide economy came to parallel the centralized state. Although there was some opposition to these measures, including a brief rebellion of resentful samurai in 1877, it was on the whole a remarkably peaceful process in which a segment of the old ruling class abolished its own privileges. Many, but not all, of these displaced elites found a soft landing in the army, bureaucracy, or business enterprises of the new regime, thus easing a painful transition.

Accompanying these social and political changes was a widespread and eager fascination with almost everything Western. Knowledge about the West—its science and technology; its various political and constitutional arrangements; its legal and educational systems; its dances, clothing, and hairstyles—was enthusiastically sought out by official missions to Europe and the United States, by hundreds of students sent to study abroad, and by many ordinary Japanese at home. Western writers were translated into Japanese. “Civilization and Enlightenment” was the slogan of the time, and both were to be found in the West. The most prominent popularizer of Western knowledge, Fukuzawa Yukichi, summed up the chief lesson of his studies in the mid-1870s—Japan was backward and needed to learn from the West: “If we compare the knowledge of the Japanese and Westerners, in letters, in technique, in commerce, or in industry, from the largest to the smallest matter, there is not one thing in which we excel. . . . In Japan’s present condition there is nothing in which we may take pride vis-à-vis the West.”

After this initial wave of uncritical enthusiasm for everything Western receded, Japan proceeded to borrow more selectively and to combine foreign and Japanese elements in distinctive ways. For example, the Constitution of 1889, drawing heavily on German experience, introduced an elected parliament, political parties, and democratic ideals, but that constitution was presented as a gift from a sacred emperor descended from the sun goddess. The parliament could advise, but ultimate power, and particularly control of the military, lay theoretically with the emperor and in practice with an oligarchy of prominent reformers acting in his name. Likewise, a modern educational system, which achieved universal primary schooling by the early twentieth century, was laced with Confucian-based moral instruction and exhortations of loyalty to the emperor. Christianity made little headway in Meiji Japan, but Shinto, an ancient religious tradition featuring ancestors and nature spirits, was elevated to the status of an official state cult. Japan’s earlier experience in borrowing massively but selectively from Chinese culture perhaps served it better in these new circumstances than either the Chinese disdain for foreign cultures or the reluctance of many Muslims to see much of value in the infidel West.

Like their counterparts in China and the Ottoman Empire, some reformers in Japan—male and female alike—argued that the oppression of women was an obstacle to the country’s modernization and that family reform was essential to gaining the respect of the West. Fukuzawa Yukichi, who was widely read, urged an end to concubinage and prostitution, advocated more education for girls, and called for gender equality in matters of marriage, divorce, and property rights. But
most male reformers understood women largely in the context of family life, seeing them as “good wife, wise mother.” By the 1880s, however, a small feminist movement arose, demanding—and modeling—a more public role for women. Some even sought the right to vote at a time when only a small fraction of men could do so. A leading feminist, Kishida Toshiko, not yet twenty years old, astonished the country in 1882 when she undertook a two-month speaking tour during which she addressed huge audiences. Only “equality and equal rights,” she argued, would allow Japan “to build a new society.” Japan must rid itself of the ancient habit of “respecting men and despising women.”

While the new Japanese government included girls in its plans for universal education, it was with a gender-specific curriculum and in schools segregated by sex. Any thought of women playing a role in public life was harshly suppressed. A Peace Preservation Law of 1887, in effect until 1922, forbade women from joining political parties and even from attending meetings where political matters were discussed. The Civil Code of 1898 accorded absolute authority to the male head of the family, while grouping all wives with “cripples and disabled persons” as those who “cannot undertake any legal action.” To the authorities of Meiji Japan, a serious transformation of gender roles was more of a threat than an opportunity.

At the core of Japan’s effort at defensive modernization lay its state-guided industrialization program. More than in Europe or the United States, the government itself established a number of enterprises, later selling many of them to private investors. It also acted to create a modern infrastructure by building railroads, creating a postal service, and establishing a national currency and banking system. From the 1880s on, the Japanese government developed a distinctive form of “labor-intensive industrialization” that relied more heavily on the country’s abundant workforce and less on the replacement of labor by machinery and capital than in Western Europe or North America. By the early twentieth century, Japan’s industrialization, organized around a number of large firms called zaibatsu, was well under way. The country became a major exporter of textiles, in part as a way to pay for needed imports of raw materials, such as cotton, owing to its limited natural resources. Soon the country was able to produce its own munitions and industrial goods as well. Its major cities enjoyed mass-circulation newspapers, movie theaters, and electric lights. All of this was accomplished through its own resources and without the massive foreign debt that so afflicted Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. No other country outside of Europe and North America had been able to launch its own Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century. It was a distinctive feature of Japan’s modern transformation.

Less distinctive, however, were the social results of that process. Taxed heavily to pay for Japan’s ambitious modernization program, many peasant families slid into poverty. Their sometimes–violent protests peaked in 1883–1884 as the Japanese countryside witnessed infanticide, the sale of daughters, and starvation.

While state authorities rigidly excluded women from political life and denied them adult legal status, they badly needed female labor in the country’s textile
industry, which was central to Japan’s economic growth. Accordingly, the majority of Japan’s textile workers were young women from poor families in the countryside. Recruiters toured rural villages, contracting with parents for their daughters’ labor in return for a payment that the girls had to repay from their wages. That pay was low and their working conditions were terrible. Most lived in factory-provided dormitories and worked twelve or more hours per day. While some committed suicide or ran away and many left after earning enough to pay off their contracts, others organized strikes and joined the anarchist or socialist movements that were emerging among a few intellectuals. One such woman, Kanno Sugako, was hanged in 1911 for participating in a plot to assassinate the emperor. Efforts to create unions and organize strikes, both illegal in Japan at the time, were met with harsh repression even as corporate and state authorities sought to depict the company as a family unit to which workers should give their loyalty, all under the beneficent gaze of the divine emperor.

Japan and the World

Japan’s modern transformation soon registered internationally. By the early twentieth century, its economic growth, openness to trade, and embrace of “civilization and enlightenment” from the West persuaded the Western powers to revise the unequal treaties in Japan’s favor. This had long been a primary goal of the

AP* Comparison

To what extent are the signs of westernization shown in the image similar to those found in the image of “The First Ottoman Constitution” found on page 843?

Not only did Japan escape from its semi-colonial entanglements with the West, but it also launched its own empire-building enterprise, even as European powers and the United States were carving up much of Asia, Africa, and Pacific Oceania into colonies or spheres of influence. It was what industrializing Great Powers did in the late nineteenth century, and Japan followed suit, in part to compensate for the relative poverty of its natural resource base. A successful war against China (1894–1895) established Japan as a formidable military competitor in East Asia, replacing China as the dominant power in the region. Ten years later in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), which was fought over rival imperial ambitions in Korea and Manchuria, Japan became the first Asian state to defeat a major European power. Through those victories, Japan also gained colonial control of Taiwan and Korea and a territorial foothold in Manchuria. And in the aftermath of World War I, Japan acquired a growing influence in China's Shandong Peninsula and control over a number of Micronesian islands under the auspices of the League of Nations.

Japan's entry onto the broader global stage was felt in many places (see Map 19.3). It added yet one more imperialist power to those already burdening a beleaguered China. Defeat at the hands of Japanese upstarts shocked Russia and triggered the 1905 revolution in that country. To Europeans and Americans, Japan was now an economic, political, and military competitor in Asia.

In the world of subject peoples, the rise of Japan and its defeat of Russia generated widespread admiration among those who saw Japan as a model for their own modern development and perhaps as an ally in the struggle against imperialism.
Some Poles, Finns, and Jews viewed the Russian defeat in 1905 as an opening for their own liberation from the Russian Empire and were grateful to Japan for the opportunity. Despite Japan’s aggression against their country, many Chinese reformers and nationalists found in the Japanese experience valuable lessons for themselves. Thousands flocked to Japan to study its achievements. Newspapers throughout the Islamic world celebrated Japan’s victory over Russia as an “awakening of the East” that might herald Muslims’ own liberation. Some Turkish women...
gave their children Japanese names. Indonesian Muslims from Aceh wrote to the Meiji emperor asking for help in their struggle against the Dutch, and Muslim poets wrote odes in his honor. The Egyptian nationalist Mustafa Kamil spoke for many when he declared: “We are amazed by Japan because it is the first Eastern government to utilize Western civilization to resist the shield of European imperialism in Asia.”

Those who directly experienced Japanese imperialism in Taiwan or Korea no doubt had a less positive view, for its colonial policies matched or exceeded the brutality of European practices. In the twentieth century, China and much of Southeast Asia suffered bitterly under Japanese imperial aggression. Nonetheless, both the idea of Japan as a liberator of Asia from the European yoke and the reality of Japan as an oppressive imperial power in its own right derived from the country’s remarkable modern transformation and its distinctive response to the provocation of Western intrusion.

REFLECTIONS

Success and Failure in History

Beyond describing what happened in the past and explaining why, historians often find themselves evaluating the events they study. When they make judgments about the past, notions of success and failure frequently come into play. Should Europe’s Industrial Revolution and its rise to global power be regarded as a success? If so, does that imply that other civilizations were failures? Should we consider Japan more successful than China or the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century? Three considerations suggest that we should be very careful in applying these ideas to the complexities of the historical record.

First, and most obviously, is the question of criteria. If the measure of success is national wealth and power, then the Industrial Revolution surely counts as a great accomplishment, at least for some. But if preservation of the environment, spiritual growth, and the face-to-face relationships of village life are more highly valued, then industrialization, as Gandhi argued, might be more reasonably considered a disaster. Certainly the expectation of endless economic growth, which derived from the Industrial Revolution, has been a primary factor in generating the climate changes that threaten modern society in the twenty-first century.

Second, there is the issue of “success for whom?” British artisans who lost their livelihood to industrial machines as well as Japanese women textile workers who suffered through the early stages of industrialization might be forgiven for not appreciating the “success” of their countries’ transformation, even if their middle-class counterparts and subsequent generations benefited. In such cases, issues of both social and generational justice complicate any easy assessment of the past.
Third, and finally, success is frequently associated with good judgment and wise choices, yet actors in the historical drama are never completely free in making their decisions, and none, of course, have the benefit of hindsight, which historians enjoy. Did the leaders of China and the Ottoman Empire fail to push industrial development more strongly, or were they not in a position to do so? Were Japanese leaders wiser and more astute than their counterparts elsewhere, or did their knowledge of China’s earlier experience and their unique national history simply provide them with circumstances more conducive to modern development? Such questions regarding the possibilities and limitations of human action have no clear-cut answers, but they might caution us about any easy assessment of success and failure.

Chapter Review

AP® Key Terms
Taiping Uprising, 830
Opium Wars, 832
Commissioner Lin Zexu, 833
unequal treaties, 833
informal empire, 834
self-strengthening, 835
Boxer Uprising, 837
Chinese revolution of 1911–1912, 838
“the sick man of Europe,” 838
Tanzimat, 841
Young Ottomans, 842
Sultan Abd al-Hamid II, 842
Young Turks, 843
Tokugawa Japan, 845
Meiji Restoration, 848
Russo-Japanese War, 852

Big Picture Questions
1. “The responses of China, the Ottoman Empire, and Japan to European powers in the nineteenth century were caused by pressures from within each of those societies.” Provide evidence to support this statement.
2. To what extent did reactions against European intrusion into China, the Ottoman Empire, and Japan affect proposals to “modernize” their governments and societies?
3. AP® Making Connections: To what extent were the responses of China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire to Western imperialism different from those of Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia?
Next Steps: For Further Study

Carter V. Finley, *The Turks in World History* (2004). A study placing the role of Turkish-speaking peoples in general and the Ottoman Empire in particular in a global context.


Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (1999). Probably the best single-volume account of Chinese history from about 1600 through the twentieth century.


Arthur Waley, *The Opium War through Chinese Eyes* (1968). An older classic that views the Opium War from various Chinese points of view.


Shirvan Neftchi, “The Decline of the Ottoman Empire,” The Caspian Report, found on YouTube. A ten-minute video that offers an interpretation of the declining fortunes of the Ottoman Empire.
Continuity and Change Arguments

In this workshop, we will work with primary sources in order to develop a source-based continuity and change argument, in preparation for the Document-Based Question on the AP® exam.

UNDERSTANDING CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ARGUMENTS

Historians create a continuity and change argument when they want to evaluate how processes, events, or civilizations have changed or stayed the same. One historian might argue that there are more changes than continuities, for example, while another might conclude that there are more continuities than changes.

A continuity and change argument is not merely a listing of changes and continuities. It is, rather, analytical and evaluative. This means that it takes a position. For example, you might argue that trade has changed more than it has stayed the same over a one-hundred-year span. Or you could argue for what you think the most interesting or significant change was over that period. What you wouldn’t argue is that trade changed over that period. That’s obvious and doesn’t need to be argued.

You would then find evidence and build your argument. But keep in mind that historians don’t pick and choose only the evidence that supports their argument. They see what’s out there and allow the evidence to support, qualify, or even modify their argument. One way to do this is to bundle evidence into two categories: the main argument and the counterargument. Often, the counterargument is signaled in the thesis statement with words such as “although” and “however.”

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ARGUMENTS ON THE AP® WORLD HISTORY EXAM

On the AP® exam, continuity and change over time is one of three reasoning skills that will be tested on the Document-Based Question and the Long-Essay Question. As you will remember from the workshop on building a historical argument (in Chapter 17), the difference between these two essay types is that the Document-Based Question requires you to use the primary source documents that are provided to weave together an argument (along with one outside piece of evidence, if you want to score that extra point), while the Long-Essay Question will require you to use the information you have learned in the world history course as evidence. These two essays make up 40 percent of the exam. Thus, knowing how to create a continuity and change argument is critical.
As you will remember from the workshop on historical arguments, creating an argument (especially one for the AP® exam) involves several specific moves:

- contextualization in an intro paragraph
- thesis that addresses the prompt using a specific historical reasoning skill
- topic sentences at the beginning of each paragraph that tie back to the thesis
- evidence that supports the thesis
- analysis/reasoning that shows how the evidence supports the thesis

**Structuring Your Continuity and Change Argument**

Continuity and change arguments have the counterargument built right in: if you’re arguing that there is more continuity, then the counterargument should address the changes, and vice versa. As a result, there are two common options for structuring a continuity and change argument, which will look very familiar from the comparative argument workshop in Chapter 18:

- Option 1 is that you have one paragraph on continuities, and one paragraph on changes.
- Option 2 is having one paragraph showing continuity and change on a single topic, and the second paragraph showing continuity and change on a second topic.

As an example, let’s say you’re discussing the changes and continuities of Chinese culture as it transitioned from the Ming to the Qing dynasty. If you take Option 1, you would first discuss continuities in Chinese culture as the dynasties transitioned from Ming rule to Qing rule, and then discuss the changes in the next paragraph. Or, if you take Option 2, you might discuss the continuities and changes in political structures in the first paragraph and then continuities and changes in social structures in the second paragraph. Remember that Option 2 has to be by topic. But, be careful! You are not comparing the Chinese under the Qing to the Chinese under the Ming. This is not a comparison. You are detailing how Chinese culture has continued and changed.

**A Model of a Continuity and Change Argument**

Let’s look at an example of a continuity and change argument from page 828 of this chapter:

In 1793, just a decade after King George III of Britain lost his North American colonies, he received yet another rebuff, this time from China. In a famous letter to the British monarch, the Chinese emperor Qianlong (chyan-loong) sharply rejected British requests for a less restricted trading relationship with his country. “Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance,” he declared. “There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians.” Qianlong’s snub simply continued the pattern of the previous several centuries, during which Chinese authorities had strictly controlled and limited the activities of European missionaries and merchants. But by 1912, little...
more than a century later, China’s long-established imperial state had collapsed, and the country had been transformed from a central presence in the global economy to a weak and dependent participant in a European-dominated world system in which Great Britain was the major economic and political player. It was a stunning reversal of fortune for a country that in Chinese eyes was the civilized center of the entire world — in their terms, the Celestial Empire or the Middle Kingdom.

This paragraph is a continuity and change argument in miniature. The authors set up the context, put forth the thesis, address both continuity and change, and provide evidence. Lastly, the authors address the counterargument. Expand upon this with more context, perhaps write a separate paragraph for continuities and changes, include more evidence, make the counterargument its own paragraph, add a conclusion summarizing your findings, and you have a Long-Essay response that is fit for the AP® exam.

If you are working on the Document-Based Question, setting up your essay will be essentially the same as what we discussed above, with the difference being that your paragraphs have to speak to the evidence found in the documents in addition to addressing the prompt.

BUILDING AP® SKILLS

1. Activity: Revising Continuity and Change Thesis Statements. Look at the prompt and thesis statements below. Determine whether you think each of the thesis statements encompasses all components of a continuity and change argument. If not, decide how to fix each one. Remember that a good thesis needs to: answer the prompt, be evaluative, provide a roadmap for the essay, and address the counterargument.

   You can use evidence from the section “The Crisis Within,” which starts on page 830, to help shape your thesis.

   Prompt: Evaluate the extent to which the Taiping Uprising altered Chinese society during the Qing dynasty.

   Thesis A: Although the Qing dynasty exam system continued after the Taiping Uprising, women were allowed to sit for the exams.

   Thesis B: Although the Taiping Uprising attempted to change Chinese civilization, the Qing dynasty, with the help of foreign influence, continued traditional Chinese dynastic functions.

   Thesis C: Although the Taiping Uprising did not lead to much change in Chinese civilization, Qing governmental policies caused massive changes to the dynasty’s global stature.

2. Activity: Building a Continuity and Change Argument Paragraph. Based on the thesis statement addressing the prompt that follows, create one body
paragraph of a continuity and change argument essay. You will need to decide whether you want to create a paragraph of continuities, a paragraph of changes, or a paragraph centered on a topic that encompasses both continuities and changes. Begin by filling in the template below using the information in the section called “The Crisis Within” that begins on page 830 for your evidence. Then write the paragraph, being sure to analyze every piece of evidence to show how it connects back to the thesis.

Prompt: Create an argument that analyzes the extent to which the Opium Wars changed China’s relationship with Europe.

Thesis: Although the Qing dynasty continued to maintain a veneer of control, the Opium Wars changed the balance of power between China and global powers.

Topic sentence:
Evidence A:
Evidence B:
Evidence C:
Analysis:

3. Activity: Creating a Source-Based Continuity and Change Argument.
Based on the prompt below, use the Working with Evidence section of this chapter (pages 857–864) to create a contextualizing intro, a thesis, and two topic sentences for paragraphs that include at least three points of evidence and an analysis that shows how the evidence supports the thesis. Then, select the evidence in the documents you would use to support your argument.

Prompt: Using the documents provided, evaluate the extent to which China changed as a result of pressures from within and without in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Intro/Context:
Thesis:
Topic sentence 1:
Evidence A:
Evidence B:
Evidence C:
Analysis:
Topic sentence 2:
Evidence A:
Evidence B:
Evidence C:
Analysis:
China: On the Brink of Change

By the end of the nineteenth century, growing numbers of thoughtful Chinese recognized that their country was in crisis. A decisive military defeat in a war with Japan (1894–1895) represented a further humiliation to a country already reduced to a semi-colonial dependent of various European powers. And the Boxer rebellion (1898–1901) disclosed a virulent antiforeign and anti-Christian outlook even among rural people. This upheaval demonstrated—once again—the ability of China’s vast peasant population to make its presence felt in the political life of the country, as it had in the Taiping Uprising of the 1850s and 1860s (see “The Crisis Within” earlier in this chapter). Its outcome—foreign occupation of Beijing and large reparation payments from China’s government—revealed China’s continuing weakness relative to European powers and Japan.

In this context, many educated Chinese began to consider various alternatives to the status quo. Some sought reform of various kinds, aimed at preserving the Qing dynasty regime. And several such projects were initiated: ending the traditional civil service examination system, modernizing the military, having consultations about a constitution, and creating elected provincial assemblies. Other voices were more revolutionary, seeking to replace dynastic China with a new society and political system altogether. The climax of this process occurred in 1912 with the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the end of several millennia of imperial rule. The sources that follow provide a glimpse of the various possibilities that awaited China on the brink of dramatic transformation.

As you read these documents, consider the extent to which Chinese attempts at reform were similar to other attempts at reform in other societies. Think about what the various authors meant by “reform” or “modernization.” Also, consider the extent to which these reform efforts were successful.

SOURCE 19.1 Toward a Constitutional Monarchy

Among the leading advocates of reform in the aftermath of China’s defeat by Japan was Kang Youwei (1858–1927), a brilliant Confucian scholar and political thinker. Understanding Confucius as a reformer, he argued that the emperor could be an active agent for China’s transformation while operating in a parliamentary and constitutional setting. With its emphasis on human goodness, self-improvement, and the moral example of superiors, Confucianism could provide a framework for real change even as it protected China from “moral degeneration” and an indiscriminate embrace of Western culture. In an appeal to the emperor in early 1898, Kang Youwei spelled out his understanding of what China needed.
Section 1
A survey of all states in the world will show that those states that undertook reforms became stronger while those states which clung to the past perished. . . . If Your Majesty, with your discerning brilliance, observes the trends in other countries, you will see that if we can change, we can preserve ourselves; but if we cannot change, we shall perish. . . . It is a principle of things that the new is strong but the old is weak. . . . [T]here are no institutions that should remain unchanged for a hundred years. Moreover our present institutions are but unworthy vestiges of the Han, Tang, Yuan, and Ming dynasties. . . . [T]hey are the products of fancy writing and corrupt dealing of the petty officials rather than the original ideas of the ancestors. To say that they are ancestral institutions is an insult to the ancestors. Furthermore institutions are for the purpose of preserving one’s territories. Now that the ancestral territory cannot be preserved, what good is it to maintain the ancestral institutions? . . .

Questions to Consider
1. In this section, how does Kang Youwei both support and challenge Confucian traditions?
2. What is the context behind Kang’s statements criticizing the origin of the current institutions?

Section 2
Nowadays the court has been undertaking some reforms, but the action of the emperor is obstructed by the ministers, and the recommendations of the able scholars are attacked by old-fashioned bureaucrats. If the charge is not “using barbarian ways to change China,” then it is “upsetting ancestral institutions.” . . . I beg Your Majesty to make up your mind and to decide on the national policy.

After studying ancient and modern institutions, Chinese and foreign, I have found that . . . ancient times were different from today. I hope that Your Majesty will daily read Mencius [a famous Confucian writer] and follow his example of loving the people . . . but it should be remembered that the [present] age of universal unification is different from that of sovereign nations. . . . As to the republican governments of the United States and France and the constitutional governments of Britain and Germany, these countries are far away and their customs are different from ours. . . . Consequently I beg Your Majesty to adopt the purpose of Peter the Great of Russia as our purpose and to take the Meiji Reform of Japan as the model of our reform. The time and place of Japan’s reforms are not remote and her religion and customs are somewhat similar to ours. Her success is manifest; her example can be followed.


Questions to Consider
1. What obstacles to reform does Kang Youwei identify in this section?
2. Why did Kang Youwei prefer the models of Peter the Great of Russia or the Meiji Restoration in Japan to those of republican France or the United States?

AP* ANALYZING HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
1. Analyze whether the author’s purpose was primarily to challenge imperial authority or primarily to preserve it.
**SOURCE 19.2 Resistance to Change**

A growing reform movement also triggered conservative opposition, rooted in particular understandings of China’s Confucian tradition. These brief excerpts from more traditionally oriented Chinese scholars illustrate that opposition.

*Conservative Reactions after the Sino-Japanese War | late 19th / early 20th century*

From Zeng Lian: “The state (dynasty) belongs to the ancestors; the emperor merely maintains the dynasty for them. He cannot change the permanent laws laid down by the ancestors.”

From Chu Chengbo: “...[O]ur trouble is not that we lack good institutions, but that we lack upright minds. If we seek to reform institutions, we must first reform men’s minds. Unless all men of ability assist each other, good laws become mere paper documents; unless those who supervise them are fair and enlightened, the venal will end up occupying the places of the worthy...”

From Ye Dehui: “An examination of the causes of success and failure in government reveals that in general the upholding of Confucianism leads to good government and the adoption of foreignism leads to disorder. ... Confucianism represents the supreme expression of justice in the principles of Heaven and the hearts of men.”


**Questions to Consider**

1. What does this text reveal about Zeng Lian’s attitude toward imperial authority?
2. Which sections of Chinese society would have found this argument appealing?
3. How might Kang Youwei have reacted to this passage?

**AP® ANALYZING HISTORICAL EVIDENCE**

1. Analyze the reasons some Chinese intellectuals opposed reforms even as the Chinese imperial structure faced increasing dangers.
**SOURCE 19.3 Gender, Reform, and Revolution**

Among those seeking to change China, the question of women’s roles in society frequently arose. The most well-known advocate for women was Qiu Jin (1875–1907). Born into a well-to-do family with liberal inclinations and married to a much older man at age eighteen, she was distinctly unsatisfied in such a conventional life and developed a growing feminist awareness, sometimes dressing in men’s clothes and Western styles. In 1903, Qiu Jin left her husband and children to pursue an education in Japan, selling her jewelry to finance the trip. Returning to China in 1906, she started a women’s magazine, the *Chinese Women’s Journal*, which was a strong advocate for women’s independence and education. Soon Qiu Jin became active in revolutionary circles. For her role in an abortive plot to overthrow the Qing dynasty, she was arrested, tortured, and beheaded in 1907 at the age of thirty-two. The selection that follows comes from her most famous appeal for the rights of women.

**QIU JIN | Address to Two Hundred Million Fellow Countrywomen | 1904**

**Section 1**

Alas, the most unfairly treated things on this earth are the two hundred million who are born as Chinese women. We consider ourselves lucky to be born to a kind father. If we are unlucky, our father will be an ill-tempered and unreasonable person who . . . will resent us and say things like “she’s eventually going to someone else’s family” and give us cold and contemptuous looks. When we grow a few years older, without bothering to ask us our thoughts, they will bind our tender, white and natural feet with a strip of cloth. . . . In the end, the flesh is mangled and the bones broken, all so that relatives, friends and neighbors can say, “the girl from so and so’s family has tiny feet.”

When the time comes (for the parents) to select a husband . . . , the daughter’s parents will go along with any proposal as long as his family is rich and powerful. . . . On the wedding day, one will sit in the brightly decorated bridal sedan chair barely able to breathe. When we arrive at the new home, if the husband is . . . no good, her family will blame it “on our wrong conduct in a previous life,” or simply “bad luck.” If we dare complain, or otherwise try to counsel our husbands, then a scolding and beating will befall us. Others who hear of the abuse will say: “She is a woman of no virtue. She does not act as a wife should!” Can you believe such words? . . . Further inequities will follow if the husband dies. The wife will have to wear a mourning dress for three years and will not be allowed to remarry. Yet, if the wife dies, the husband only needs to wear a blue (mourning) braid. Some men find even that unbecoming and do not bother to wear it at all. Even when the wife has only been dead for three days, he can go out and cavort and indulge himself. . . . In the beginning, Heaven created all people with no differences between men and women. . . . Why are things so unjust? Everyday these men say, “We ought to be equal and treat people kindly.” Then why do they treat women so unfairly and unequally as if they were African slaves?

**Questions to Consider**

1. How does Qiu Jin describe the difficulties that faced Chinese women?
2. How does she account for these sad conditions?
3. In what ways did Qiu Jin’s feminism pose a challenge to Chinese social traditions?
Section 2

A woman has to learn not to depend on others, but to rely on herself instead. . . . Why can’t we reject footbinding? Are they afraid of women being educated, knowledgeable, and perhaps surpassing them? Men do not allow us to study. We must not simply go along with their decision without even challenging them. . . .

However, from now on I hope we can leave the past behind us and focus on our future. . . . If you have a decent husband who wants to establish a school, do not stop him. If you have a fine son who wishes to study abroad, do not stop him. . . . If you have a son, send him to school. Do the same for your daughter and never bind her feet. If you have a young girl, the best choice would be for her to attend school, but even if she is unable to attend schools, you should teach her to read and write at home. If you come from a family of officials that has money, you should persuade your husband to establish schools and factories and do good deeds that will help common people. If your family is poor, you should work hard to help your husband. . . . These are my hopes. All of you are aware that we are about to lose our country. Men can scarcely protect themselves. How can we rely on them? We must revitalize ourselves. Otherwise all will be too late when the country is lost. Everybody! Everybody! Please keep my hopes alive!

Questions to Consider

1. What solutions does Qiu Jin propose?
2. To what extent might these solutions pose a political threat to the Chinese state?

AP® ANALYZING HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

1. Analyze the extent to which Qiu Jin’s feminism posed a political challenge to China’s imperial system.

SOURCE 19.4 Cutting the Queue

Another sign of changing times in late nineteenth-century China was the growing frequency with which more radical Chinese men began to cut or hide their queue, the long braided tail of hair that descended from their largely shaved heads. That hairstyle had been forcibly imposed by Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty and had been periodically resisted since the seventeenth century. From the mid-1890s on, cutting the queue became a symbol of opposition to the Qing dynasty, of a favorable attitude toward modernization, and of a commitment to substantial political change in China. Source 19.4 provides an illustration from 1911 of this radical political action.
The Modernization of China | 1911

Questions to Consider

1. How do you explain the responses to this event by the various figures visible in the image? Notice especially the man in the lower left with his hands upraised, and the man in Western dress in the lower right.

2. How does the public setting for this event shape your understanding of its significance? Keep in mind also that earlier in its history, the Qing dynasty had applied the death penalty for those cutting their queue.

AP® ANALYZING HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

1. Analyze the extent to which cutting the queue was a revolutionary act.

SOURCE 19.5 Toward Revolution

While some advocates for change pressed for various reforms within the framework of Qing dynasty China, others felt that the millennia-old monarchy itself had to be overthrown if China was to modernize and prosper as a nation. Among them was Wang Jingwei, a political figure who had studied in Japan and later joined the revolutionary movement. When the Chinese government in 1908 announced plans for developing a quite conservative constitution, Wang Jingwei wrote a ferocious rebuttal, excerpted in Source 19.5. At the time, he was in prison awaiting execution for his revolutionary activities.

WANG JINGWEI | We Want a Republic, Not a Constitutional Monarchy | April 25, 1910

Section 1

The constitutionalists say that . . . the establishment of a constitutional monarchy will lead to the establishment of a good government. But we revolutionaries emphatically do . . . [U]nless the monarchical power is destroyed, there is no way of eliminating the existing state system and replacing it with something new.
Questions to Consider
1. Why does Wang Jingwei believe that an effective constitutional government can only be achieved after a revolution?

Section 2
Speaking of China’s relations with the outside world, we cannot but feel frightened and alarmed; she is so weak that her chance of survival, for all practical purposes, has become very slim indeed. Knowing her impending peril, how can any Chinese enjoy peace of mind . . .? With a constitutional government scheduled to be established, everyone believes that all of China’s problems, foreign and domestic, will be automatically resolved. Like a man who has taken hallucinatory drugs, we are fascinated with appearance at the expense of reality.

Neither will the situation improve nor can she be rejuvenated unless there is a basic change in political structure. The time for making this change is very late, but by no means too late.


Questions to Consider
1. What threats to China’s survival is Wang Jingwei referring to?
2. Why does the author believe that the imperial system endangers China’s future?

AP® ANALYZING HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
1. Analyze the potential audience for this message. Which sectors of Chinese society might have been drawn to this revolutionary message? How does the author tailor his statement to specific audiences?

SOURCE 19.6 The Chinese Revolution of 1911
In late 1911 and early 1912, more than 2,000 years of Chinese imperial history came to an inglorious end amid the confused maneuverings of various revolutionary groups, Qing dynasty loyalists, and constitutional reformers. The young boy-emperor Puyi abdicated the imperial throne, and power passed to a prominent military leader, Yuan Shikai. Revolutionary ideas had penetrated the ranks of both officers and soldiers in China’s modernizing “New Army,” which had been in the making since 1901. Source 19.6, from a French newspaper of 1911, provides a visual account of the evolution of the Chinese military, with figures on the left representing older and now outdated Qing dynasty units, and those on the right depicting the modernized forces of the New Army that were so instrumental in the revolution of 1911. As it happened, those dramatic events were but
the prelude for a far deeper and more violent revolutionary transformation of China in the half century that followed. At the time, however, they marked a momentous turning point for an ancient civilization poised at the edge of a tumultuous upheaval.

About the Insurrectional Movement in China | 1911

Questions to Consider
1. What distinguishes these two groups of military men from one another?
2. What does the image imply about their attitudes toward one another?

AP® ANALYZING HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
1. To what extent did this image reflect a European conception of reform and modernization?
2. To what extent was its message consistent with those of the other authors in this section?

DOING HISTORY

1. AP® Using Sources to Develop an Argument: Evaluate the extent to which Chinese reactions to the decline of the Qing dynasty differed from one another.
2. AP® Analyzing Historical Evidence: What do these sources contribute to our understanding of the eventual collapse of the Qing dynasty?
3. AP® Analyzing Historical Evidence: “China as a culture and a political system must be destroyed in order to preserve China as a nation.” To what extent would the creators of these sources have agreed or disagreed with this statement?
4. AP® Comparison: Imagine a conversation among the authors of these sources. What points of agreement might they find? What conflicts would likely arise among them?
The war between China and Japan during 1894–1895, fought largely over control of Korea, signaled a radical reversal in the historical relationship of these two East Asian countries. It also marked major turning points in the internal development of both countries. Voice 19.1, from two Chinese historians, David and Yurong Atwill, describes the significance of that war for China, while historian James Huffman does the same for Japan in Voice 19.2.

**VOICE 19.1**

David and Yurong Atwill on the Significance of the War for China | 2010

[N]o military loss affected the Qing court and the Chinese populace quite as much as their defeat at the hands of the Japanese. . . . For centuries China had sat at the center of a vast tributary network, with neighboring countries acknowledging China’s dominant military, political and commercial importance. . . . Contemporary observers all assumed Japan would be defeated quickly. It was a horrible shock to China when Japan not only routed Chinese troops dispatched to Korea, but with devastating precision devastated China’s navy. These defeats dealt a savage blow to China’s national pride. . . .

If the war eroded China’s confidence, the peace was excruciating. With the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan proved itself fully as capable as its European counterparts at extracting concessions, indemnities, and territories. The Chinese public, who had been sheltered from the Qing’s lack of military modernization, were whipped into a frenzy over the defeats and were further enraged at [China’s] submissive acceptance of Japan’s peace terms. While the Qing dynasty survived for another fifteen years, it would never recover psychologically from the humiliation it received at the hands of the Japanese. This truly marks the beginning of the end for the Qing dynasty.


**VOICE 19.2**

James L. Huffman on the Significance of the War for Japan | 2010

More important than the victory, . . . was the explosion of patriotic fervor the war ignited at home. “The excitement generated among the Japanese people was beyond imagination,” the commentator Ubukata Toshiro recalled. . . . By war’s end, Japan had become a different place; proud of defeating Asia’s giant, confident in its military might, thirsty for more territory.

The postwar years saw a rush of support for this vision of strength, even as Japan’s cities became both modern and massive. . . . In part, that reflected a rise in industry—and city jobs—as the Sino-Japanese War indemnity poured more than 300 million yen into the economy. . . . When Japan provided roughly half of the international force that put down China’s Boxer Rebellion in 1900, and then shared handsomely in the indemnity, the pride that had marked the Sino-Japanese War was reignited.


**AP® Analyzing Secondary Sources**

1. In what ways was the Sino-Japanese War devastating for China?
2. What impact did the Sino-Japanese War have on Japan?
3. Integrating Primary and Secondary Sources: What evidence from the primary sources might support the Atwills’ conclusion that the Sino-Japanese War “marks the beginning of the end for the Qing dynasty”?
Questions 1–3 refer to this passage.

We have heard that in your own country opium is prohibited with the utmost strictness and severity: — this is a strong proof that you know full well how hurtful opium is to humans. . . . You ought not to have this harmful drug transferred to another country, and above all others, how much less to us! . . . Has China ever sent you a noxious product from its soil? No. But the things that come from your country are only calculated to harm our country.

— Qing government commissioner Lin Zexu to Queen Victoria of Great Britain, 1839

1. Based on your knowledge of world history and this excerpt, which of the following best describes a result of the Opium Wars between Great Britain and China in the early nineteenth century?
   a. Because of its decisive victory, China was able to renegotiate a more equal trade agreement with Britain.
   b. China lost her place as a major economic power because of the total destruction of her land in the war.
   c. China and Britain were able to maintain an equal balance of trade for the remainder of the nineteenth century.
   d. Because of unequal treaties, European imperial powers carved out spheres of influence in China.

2. Which of the following best explains the purpose of Lin Zexu’s letter to Queen Victoria?
   a. A request to create a more balanced trade relationship between Britain and China
   b. A plea for the importation of only necessary household goods into China
   c. A demand for the British to stop importing opium into China
   d. A threat to stop all trade with Europe if certain demands were not met

3. Rebellions in China, such as the Taiping Uprising and the Boxer Uprising, were a response to
   a. European powers’ colonial takeover of China’s government.
   b. continued foreign economic involvement in China and a weakening Qing government.
   c. the increased involvement of China in interregional trade with Japan and Russia.
   d. the perceived weakness of Europe because of World War I.
Questions 4–6 refer to this map.

Colonial Asia in the Early Twentieth Century

4. The expansion of nineteenth-century European empires into Asia was most likely the result of which of these historical processes?
   a. The spread of industrialization
   b. The rise of communism
   c. The spread of Enlightenment ideas
   d. The creation of military alliances

5. Based on the map and your knowledge of world history, what conclusion about Asian reactions to imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is most accurate?
   a. Most groups in Asia welcomed European colonization.
   b. Some groups actively resisted European powers, while some chose to work with the colonial governments.
   c. Most African groups continually fought European incursions, while most Asian groups accepted European rule.
   d. Most elites in both regions rejected European rule and led rebellions against Europeans.
6. Which of these comparisons between European imperialism in Africa (Chapter 18) and Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is most accurate?
   a. There was a greater number of settler colonies in Asia than in Africa.
   b. European imperialism in Asia was mainly focused on economics, but in Africa imperial powers mainly focused on religion.
   c. There was resistance to European imperialism in Africa but not in Asia.
   d. Social Darwinism played an important causal role in Africa and in Asia.

Short-Answer Questions

1. Use the passage below and your knowledge of world history to answer all parts of the question that follows.

   A consequence of intellectual borrowing from Europe [in the mid-nineteenth century] was the emergence of a distinguished group of intellectuals who hoped for an ideal society quite different from the one they inhabited. For conservative Ottoman leaders, this was an awful outcome. Nevertheless, this transformation of Ottoman intellectuals who were exposed to western thinking was a catalyst for social change.

   — M. Sukru Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition (Studies in Middle Eastern History)*, 1995

   a. Identify ONE example of political modernization/westernization by the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.

   b. Identify ONE example of social or cultural modernization/westernization by the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.

   c. Explain ONE effect of the example you gave in EITHER A or B.

2. Use your knowledge of world history to answer all parts of the question that follows.

   a. Explain ONE cause of European imperialism in Asia in the nineteenth century.

   b. Explain ONE example of Asian accommodations to European imperialism in the nineteenth century.

   c. Explain ONE example of Asian resistance to European imperialism in the nineteenth century.
3. Use the image and your knowledge of world history to answer all parts of the question that follows.

A Russian bear and an English lion fight over the dead dragon labeled “China,” while the United States, Japan, and several European nations look on. From the American satirical magazine *Puck*, 1900.

**A.** Identify ONE factor that led to the decline of the Chinese Qing dynasty during the nineteenth century.

**B.** Explain one effect of the decline of the Chinese Qing dynasty during the nineteenth century.

**C.** Explain how the factor discussed in A or B compares to a factor in the decline of another Chinese dynasty before the nineteenth century.
Document-Based Question

Using these sources and your knowledge of world history, develop an argument in response to the prompt.

1. Evaluate the extent to which industrialization fundamentally altered people’s way of life.

Document 1

Source: Documents from the Luddite movement. The first is a threat from a Luddite to an industrialized fabric workshop, ca. 1811. The second is a song entitled “General Ludd’s Triumph,” explaining the purpose of the Luddite Movement.

If you do Not Cause those Dressing Machines to be Remov’d Within the Bounds of Seven Days . . . your factory and all that it Contains Will and Shall Surely Be Set on fire . . . it is Not our Desire to Do you the Least Injury, But We are fully Determin’d to Destroy Both Dressing Machines and Steam Looms.

These Engines of mischief were sentenced to die / By unanimous vote of the Trade / And Ludd who can all opposition defy / Was the Grand executioner made.

Document 2

Source: “Death’s Dispensary,” a cartoon drawn by George Pinwell for a London magazine decrying water pollution as a source of disease, especially among the poor, 1866. The caption reads, “Open to the poor, gratis, by permission of the Parish.”
Document 3

Source: Map of the world showing migration patterns out of Europe as the world industrialized in the 19th century.

Document 4

Source: Chart showing the share of economic output by country, 1750–1900.

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<td>7.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE REST OF THE WORLD</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia (India/Pakistan)</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Document 5**

*Source: The Communist Manifesto*, written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in response to the devastating social results of industrialization, 1848.

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. . . . Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinct feature: it has simplified class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. . . . All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries . . . , that [use] raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe.

**Document 6**

*Source: Refugee from King Leopold's Congo, speaking after the invention of the bicycle in Europe increased the demand for rubber, ca. 1895.*

We were always in the forest to find the rubber vines, to go without food, and our women had to give up cultivating the fields and gardens. Then we starved. . . . We begged the white man to leave us alone, saying we could get no more rubber, but the white men and their soldiers said “Go. You are only beasts yourselves. . . .” When we failed and our rubber was short, the soldiers came to our towns and killed us. Many were shot, some had their ears cut off; others were tied up with ropes round their necks and taken away.

**Document 7**

*Source: Kang Youwei, Confucian scholar and adviser to the Chinese emperor, appeal to the emperor spelling out his understanding of what China needed, 1898.*

After studying ancient and modern institutions, Chinese and foreign, I have found that . . . ancient times were different from today. I hope that Your Majesty will daily read Mencius [a famous Confucian writer] and follow his example of loving the people . . . but it should be remembered that the [present] age of universal unification is different from that of sovereign nations. . . . As to the republican governments of the United States and France and the constitutional governments of Britain and Germany, these countries are far away and their customs are different from ours. . . . Consequently I beg Your Majesty to adopt the purpose of Peter the Great of Russia as our purpose and to take the Meiji Reform of Japan as the model of our reform. The time and place of Japan’s reforms are not remote and her religion and customs are somewhat similar to ours. Her success is manifest; her example can be followed.
Long-Essay Questions  Using your knowledge of world history, develop an argument in response to one of the following questions.

2. Newly industrialized states often enlarged their empires, conquered new territories, colonized other parts of the world, and established transoceanic relationships.
   Evaluate the extent to which the establishment of empires during the age of industry led to social and political transformations in various parts of the world from 1750 to 1900.

3. The period from 1750 to 1900 was marked by revolutions and rebellions, which led to the development of new nation-states.
   Evaluate the extent to which new political philosophies led to rebellions and revolutions from 1750 to 1900.

4. The rise of capitalism and global empires led to new patterns of long-distance migrations.
   Evaluate the extent to which new patterns of long-distance migration led to transformations in host societies in the nineteenth century.