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the greatest number of laws restricting our channels of peaceful protest had been barred to 5
rights and progress, until today we have us, that the decision was made to embark on
reached a stage where we have almost no violent forms of political struggle, and to form
rights at all. Umkhonto we Sizwe. We did so not because we section three
desired such a course, but solely because the
[. . .] What were we, the leaders of our government had left us with no other choice. In
people, to do? Were we to give in to the show of the Manifesto of Umkhonto published on 16 /
force and the implied threat against future December 1961, which is exhibit AD, we said:
action, or were we to fight it and, if so, how?
We had no doubt that we had to continue The time comes in the life of any nation Nelson Mandela
the fight. Anything else would have been abject when there remain only two
surrender. Our problem was not whether to choices — submit or fight. That time has now
fight, but was how to continue the fight. We of come to South Africa. We shall not submit
the ANC had always stood for a non-racial and we have no choice but to hit back by all
democracy, and we shrank from any action means in our power in defence of our
which might drive the races further apart than people, our future, and our freedom.[…]
they already were. But the hard facts were that Four forms of violence were possible. There
fifty years of non-violence had brought the is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is
African people nothing but more and more terrorism, and there is open revolution. We
repressive legislation, and fewer and fewer chose to adopt the first method and to exhaust it
rights. It may not be easy for this court to before taking any other decision.
understand, but it is a fact that for a long time In the light of our political background the
the people had been talking of violence — of the choice was a logical one. Sabotage did not
day when they would fight the white man and involve loss of life, and it offered the best hope
win back their country — and we, the leaders of for future race relations. Bitterness would be
the ANC, had nevertheless always prevailed kept to a minimum and, if the policy bore fruit,
upon them to avoid violence and to pursue democratic government could become a reality.
peaceful methods. When some of us discussed This is what we felt at the time, and this is what
this in May and June of 1961, it could not be we said in our manifesto (exhibit AD):
denied that our policy to achieve a non-racial
state by non-violence had achieved nothing, and We of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought
that our followers were beginning to lose to achieve liberation without bloodshed and
confidence in this policy and were developing civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that
disturbing ideas of terrorism. [. . .] our first actions will awaken everyone to a
At the beginning of June 1961, after a long realisation of the disastrous situation to which
and anxious assessment of the South African the nationalist policy is leading. We hope that
situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the we will bring the government and its
conclusion that as violence in this country was supporters to their senses before it is too late,
inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for so that both the government and its policies
African leaders to continue preaching peace and can be changed before matters reach the
non-violence at a time when the government desperate state of civil war.
met our peaceful demands with force.
This conclusion was not easily arrived at. 10 The initial plan was based on a careful 15
It was only when all else had failed, when all analysis of the political and economic situation
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